Harmonizing Margins: The Regulation of Margin Levels in Stock Index Futures Markets by Furbush, Dean & Poulsen, Annette
Cornell Law Review
Volume 74
Issue 5 July 1989 Article 5
Harmonizing Margins: The Regulation of Margin
Levels in Stock Index Futures Markets
Dean Furbush
Annette Poulsen
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dean Furbush and Annette Poulsen, Harmonizing Margins: The Regulation of Margin Levels in Stock Index Futures Markets ,
74 Cornell L. Rev. 873 (1989)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol74/iss5/5
HARMONIZING MARGINS: THE REGULATION
OF MARGIN LEVELS IN STOCK INDEX
FUTURES MARKETS
Dean Furbush t
Annette Poulsen tt
Since the October 1987 stock market crash, many commenta-
tors have recommended policy changes intended to prevent a recur-
rence. The Brady Commission, appointed by President Reagan,
presented a comprehensive reform program that emphasized the
recognition that stocks, stock index futures, and stock options are
components of one market, not individual markets.1 The Brady Re-
port recommends that one agency coordinate regulatory issues
across market segments, recommends that coordinated "circuit
breakers" be installed to prevent market "meltdowns," and argues
that margin levels for purchasing and holding securities should be
made consistent across marketplaces to control speculation and fi-
nancial leverage. The effect of "harmonizing" margins would be in-
creased margins for stock index futures and options contracts. In
this article, we consider the rationale behind the harmonizing of
margins and the effect of changing margin levels for stock index fu-
tures on both futures and equity markets.
Most observers consider margin levels for stock index futures
sufficient to protect futures markets. The Brady Commission recog-
nizes that the "marking-to-market" that occurs every day in futures
markets removes most of the risk that investors would not be able to
honor their contract obligations. Even during the unprecedented
market movement of October 1987, no investor lost money on stock
index futures contracts due to default at either the Chicago Mercan-
t Office of Economic Analysis, Securities and Exchange Commission. The Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any
private publication or statement by any of its employees. The views expressed here are
those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or the
author's colleagues on the Staff of the Commission.
tt Department of Finance, University of Georgia. The authors wish to thankJeffry
Netter for many hours of assistance. This paper also benefitted from discussions with
Brandon Becker, Ken Lehn, Fred McChesney, and the participants of a conference at
Cornell University. Remaining errors are our own.
1 See PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS REPORT OF THE PRESIDEN-
TIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS (1988). Because Nicholas Brady was the
chairman of the Task Force, it is generally called the "Brady Commission" and its re-
port, the "Brady Report."
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tile Exchange or the Chicago Board of Trade.2
Criticism of low margins for stock index future contracts cen-
ters on the effect of low margins on the financial integrity of equities
markets. Commentators argue that low futures margins allow inves-
tors to purchase billions of dollars worth of stock index futures in
very short periods of time, and that those transactions "have repeat-
edly sent the stock market into violent gyrations .... [Stock index
futures] have escalated the leverage and volatility of the entire stock
market to unacceptable levels." 3
Arguments for higher margin levels can be summarized by the
following sequence of assertions: First, performance margins in fu-
tures markets are set without regard to their external effects in equi-
ties markets; second, low performance margins encourage trading
by speculators and other informationless traders; third, the pres-
ence of these traders provides an illusion of liquidity, but during
periods of emergency, results in higher price volatility in futures
markets; fourth, the higher price volatility is transferred to equity
markets by index arbitragers and spillover; and finally, liquidity in
the equities markets is insufficient to handle the excessive order flow
and price volatility.
In the following sections, we examine the merit of these argu-
ments. In Section I we provide background on margin require-
ments for equity and futures securities, and in Section II we
consider appropriate margin levels for safety in futures markets and
the role of equity markets in shaping futures margins. In Section III
we discuss the linkage between equity markets and futures markets
and in Section IV we consider the direct effect of changes in S&P
500 futures margins on the volume and price volatility of these
contracts.
Overall, this paper supports the following points: First, the ar-
gument for raising futures margins must rest on their external ef-
fects in equity markets; margins have been adequate for the financial
integrity of financial futures markets. Second, raising margins to
discourage speculators from trading impairs market liquidity. In
October 1987, speculators maintained their unintentional role as
providers of liquidity during the market crash by serving as net buy-
ers of index futures. Third, raising margins to index arbitragers en-
courages the direct use of equity markets leading to wider price
2 See DIVISION OF TRADING AND MARKETS, COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING COM-
MISSION, FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF STOCK INDEX FUTURES DURING
OCTOBER 1987 at 66 (1988) [hereinafter FOLLOW Up REPORT].
3 See Calming the Markets, Washington Post, July 25, 1988 at Al 1, col. I (quoting
John Shad, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission from 1981 through
June 1987).
874 [Vol. 74:873
HARMONIZING MARGINS
swings than occur under the current system. Fourth, no evidence
supports the view that higher futures market performance margins
would have dampened price movement during the stock market
crash or, more generally, in day-to-day operations.
I
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Margins in equity markets and futures markets are fundamen-
tally different. A trade in the equities markets transfers ownership
of a security from one party to another. A margin payment repre-
sents the down payment on the security purchase, similar to the
downpayment on the acquisition of any good. On the other hand,
the product sold in a futures market is a contract that obligates the
buyer to purchase the asset from which it is derived some time in the
future. No title changes hands with the transaction. A margin in the
futures market resembles the earnest money presented prior to
purchase of a house, guaranteeing contract performance. In addi-
tion, unlike margins for equity markets, margins for futures con-
tracts are "marked-to-market" daily, subtracting or adding any
losses or profits earned on the contract from the margin account. If
the margin account falls below the required maintenance margin,
the investor must replenish the account.
In 1934, Congress gave authority to the Federal Reserve Board
to set margin levels in equities markets on the grounds that margins
in equities transactions extend credit, and thus the margin level
should be considered part of monetary and fiscal policy with direct
macroeconomic effects. 4 But at the current level of margin debt, the
importance of credit margins in equity markets is not a practical
macroeconomic policy concern. The vast majority of securities are
owned outright, either through borrowing from other sources or
purchasing without credit. At the end of December 1988, margin
debt was only 1.3 percent of the value of the stocks listed in the
NYSE. 5
A. Regulation of Margins on Equity Securities
Before 1934, despite earlier proposals for governmental regula-
tion of credit in securities markets, the exchanges and individual
brokers set margin requirements. 6 The NYSE first interceded in
4 See Brenner, Margin Authority: No Reason for a Change, 1 J. FUTURES MARKETS 487
(1981).
5 NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE FACTBOOK 1989 at 25, 57 (1989).
6 See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, A REVIEW AND EVAL-
UATION OF FEDERAL MARGIN REGULATIONS, 44-50, 85-91 (1984) [hereinafter FEDERAL RE-
SERVE REPORT]. The FEDERAL RESERVE REPORT states that serious proposals for
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margin regulation in 1913 when it adopted a rule that said in part
that margins that were not "proper and adequate" could be detri-
mental to the exchange. 7 After 1913, exchange members continued
to set their own margin requirements but'were subject to the proper
and adequate rule. By 1922, margins were generally about 17 per-
cent.8 In June 1929, the NYSE imposed a 25 percent initial margin
requirement to replace the proper and adequate rule, although indi-
vidual brokers were commonly setting their own margins as high as
50 percent by this time. 9 The President of the NYSE testified that in
the spring and summer of 1929 brokers dramatically raised their
margin requirements due to fear about the inflation in the market.' 0
The October 1929 crash, however, caused a dramatic change in
the margins set by brokers and the exchanges. During October and
November of 1929 as stock prices fell and margin calls could not be
met, many brokers (and banks) lowered and even waived their mar-
gin requirements to mitigate the effects of additional margin calls.
In 1931, the NYSE reduced its minimum margin requirement to 20
percent in an attempt to stem future price declines and margin
calls. '
The 1929 crash provided the impetus for the federal regulation
of margins contained in the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. 12 The
crash was widely believed to have been caused by "excessive" specu-
lation in stocks fueled by credit; it generated pressure to impose
regulations to curb excesses of the market place. Theory and em-
pirical evidence, however, minimizes the importance of margin-fu-
eled speculation. 13 In addition, despite the lack of a uniform margin
structure in 1929, margin requirements were sufficient to protect
the integrity of the market-no bank became insolvent because of
extension of securities credit, and only three broker/dealers could
not meet their commitments.' 4
In any event, the crash motivated Congress to authorize the
governmental regulation of credit began after a panic in 1907. The first federal regula-
tion of credit for equity securities was contained in the 1913 Federal Reserve Act and
applied to banks. In addition to the FEDERAL RESERVE REPORT, the discussion of the
history and present regulation of equities margins is derived from L. Loss, FUNDAMEN-
TALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 652-73 (1988); T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REG-
ULATION 10.11 (1985).
7 FEDERAL RESERVE REPORT, supra note 6, at 45.
8 Id. at 45.
9 Id. at 86-87.
10 Id. at 88.
11 See id. at 89-90. In June 1931, the NYSE lowered its initial margin requirement
to 20 percent. Starting in September 1933, the NYSE set minimum maintenance mar-
gins, which replaced the brokers' discretion in when to make a margin call.
12 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
13 For a discussion see FEDERAL RESERVE REPORT supra note 6, at 157.
14 Id. at 90.
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Federal Reserve Board to regulate initial and maintenance mar-
gins.15 Section 7(a) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act gives the
Federal Reserve the power to set rules and regulations "with respect
to the amount of credit that may be initially extended and subse-
quently maintained on any security (other than an exempted secur-
ity)." 16 Sections 7 (c) and 7(d) classify the persons covered by
Federal Reserve margin regulations.' 7 Section 7(c) makes it unlaw-
ful for any "member of a national securities exchange or any broker
or dealer" to extend credit or maintain credit in contravention of
the rules and regulation set forth by the Federal Reserve Board
under 7(a).' 8 Section 7(d) authorizes similar regulation for persons
not covered under 7(c). 19
Congressional testimony and later analysis suggests that three
goals underlaid the Congressional regulation of margin require-
ments.20 First, Congress wanted to limit credit financed speculation
in securities, which allegedly drained funds from more productive
investments. Second, the margin requirements were imposed to
protect individual unsophisticated investors from too-highly lever-
aged speculation in the stock market. Third, the margin require-
Iments were to be used by the Federal Reserve Board to provide
market stability.
Commentators have theoretically and empirically attacked these
justifications for margin regulation, especially the first two. 2 1
Figlewski notes, for example, that a margin loan to purchase already
issued stock does nothing more than facilitate the transfer of owner-
ship of existing assets.2 2 Thus, margin lending does not divert
credit (and resources) from other productive uses. Further, Figlew-
ski states that margin regulations are a very inefficient way to protect
small investors from overextending themselves in speculation in
stocks. Even ignoring the argument that individual investors should
be free to make their own choices, Figlewski notes that across the
'5 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1982).
16 Id. See also L. Loss, supra note 6, at 652 n.50 (noting that the SEC, not the Fed-
eral Reserve Board, defines exempted security).
17 15 U.S.C. § 78g(b)-(c) (1982).
18 Id. at § 78g(c).
19 Id. at § 78g(d).
20 For discussions of the alleged goals for Congressional regulation of margins see
L. Loss supra note 6, at 652-53; Figlewski, Margins and Market Integrity: Margin Settingfor
Stock Index Futures and Options, 4J. FUTURES MARKETS 385 (1984); Luckett, On the Effective-
ness of the Federal Reserve's Margin Requirement, 37J. POL. EcoN. 158 (1966).
21 See FEDERAL RESERVE REPORT, supra note 6 (concluding that the case for govern-
mental regulation of margins for the first two reasons was very weak, and that the case
for governmental regulation of margins to increase stability was not overwhelming on
either side); L. Loss, supra note 6, at 654 (stating that the Federal Reserve Board actions
have concentrated on the third motivation for regulation).
22 See Figlewski, supra note 20, at 385.
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board margin regulations do not discriminate among investors by
their sophistication and ability to bear risk. Figlewski adds that the
theoretical and empirical support for margin regulation to increase
market stability is weak.
B. Present Federal Reserve Board Regulations
The Federal Reserve Board's application of its power to regu-
late margins is contained in Regulations T, U, G, and X.23 Regula-
tion T controls the extension of credit by brokers and dealers, and
includes the initial margin required for various types of securities. 24
Under Regulation T, the required margin for a nonexempt security
is 50 percent of its current market value.25 Thus, a customer who
wishes to purchase $10,000 in stocks must put up at least $5000 in
cash or securities with a loan value of $5000. The regulation allows
exchanges and brokers to set higher initial and maintenance
margins. 26
The exchanges have set margin requirements in addition to
those in Regulation T. Most importantly, the exchanges have re-
quired maintenance margins. For example, NYSE Rule 431 re-
quires that for long securities purchased on margin, the customer
must maintain 25 percent of the current market value of the security
in a margin account.27 In addition, the NYSE members frequently
have "house margin rules" that are higher than the regulations of
the Federal Reserve Board or the NYSE. 28 Finally, the NYSE may
impose special margin requirements on individual securities or gen-
23 See 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1-.130 (Regulation T); 221.1-.123 (Regulation U); 207.1-
.112 (Regulation G); 224.1-.3 (Regulation X) (1989). The enforcement of the margin
rules is handled by the SEC. L. Loss, supra note 6, at 665.
24 12 C.F.R. § 220.1-.130 (1989). The Federal Reserve Board never has used its
statutory authority to set maintenance margins. See T. HAZEN, supra note 6, at 288.
25 12 C.F.,R. § 220.18(a). Regulation T, which also sets margin requirements for
exempted securities (margin required by the creditor in good faith), short sales of
nonexempted securities (generally 150 percent of the current market value), short sales
of exempted securities (100 percent of current market value plus margin required by
creditor), nonmargin, nonexempted securities or long position in any option (100 per-
cent of current market value), and several other securities including certain types of
options, is discussed later. 12 C.F.R. § 220.18(b)-(f) (1989).
The Federal Reserve Board has changed its initial margin requirement numerous
times since 1934. Historically, the Federal Reserve Board initial margin requirements
have been (effective date, rate): 10/15/34, 45%; 2/1/36, 55%; 11/1/37, 40%; 2/5/45,
50%; 7/5/45, 75%; 1/21/46, 100%; 2/1/47, 75%; 3/30/49, 50%; 1/17/51, 75%;
2/20/53, 50%; 1/4/55, 70%; 4/23/55, 70%; 1/16/58, 50%; 8/5/58, 70%; 10/16/58,
90%; 7/28/60, 70%; 7/10/62, 50%; 11/6/63, 70%; 6/8/68, 80%; 5/6/70, 65%;
12/6/71, 55%; 11/24/72, 65%; 1/3/74, 50%. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE FACTBOOK
1988, at 58 [hereinafter NYSE FACTBOOK 1988]. Since 1981, the NYSE Factbooks have
incorrectly reported the 1962 margin level as 90%.
26 12 C.F.R. § 220.5 (1989).
27 NYSE Rule 431(c)(1) (1989).
28 NYSE FACTBOOK 1988, supra note 25, at 57.
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erally in certain situations. 29
Regulation U, adopted in 1936, applies to extensions of credit
by banks, 30 and Regulation G, adopted in 1968, applies to exten-
sions of credit by persons other than brokers, dealers, or banks.3 '
While it is not required to do so, the Federal Reserve Board has set
the same margin requirements for Regulations T, U, and G. Finally,
to restrict borrowing at lower margin levels from unregulated for-
eign lenders, in 1971 the Federal Reserve Board adopted Regula-
tion X. Regulation X, which applies to borrowers, requires all
borrowers who trade securities in United States markets to comply
with the margin requirements of Regulations T, U, and G.3 2
C. Regulation of Margins on Derivative Securities
Little direct federal regulation of margins on futures contracts
exists. 3 3 While the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) is authorized to regulate much of the structure of contract
markets including approval of rules relating to margins, the CFTC is
not authorized to set individual margin requirements. Specifically,
the CFTC is statutorially required to approve all rules of a contract
market, "except those rules relating to the setting of levels of mar-
gin."3 4 The Federal Reserve Board has claimed that, at a minimum,
margins on stock-related futures are subject to its jurisdiction,
although the futures exchanges dispute this claim.3 5
Since the role of margins in futures and equities markets are
different, it is logical that different regulatory schemes with different
margin criteria exist for futures and equities.3 6 As noted above, eq-
uity transactions change ownership of an asset while futures con-
tracts commit the participants to buy or sell an asset at a specified
time. In addition to initial margins set by the exchanges, the ex-
changes set performance or maintenance margins for future con-
tracts, and futures positions are marked to market daily. If the
29 See NYSE Rule 431(b)(3) (1989). For example the NYSE FACTBOOK 1988, supra
note 25, at 58 reports that on November 2, 1987 the NYSE and other exchanges in-
creased margin option requirements for index stock options.
30 12 C.F.R. § 221.1-.123 (1989).
3' 12 G.F.R. § 207.1-.112 (1989).
32 12 G.F.R. § 224.1-.3 (1989).
33 We do not discuss the Federal regulatory scheme for options on margins. Suffice
to say it is a complicated system of overlapping jurisdictions of the Federal Reserve
Board, the SEC, and the CFTC. See FEDERAL RESERVE REPORT, supra note 6. at 50-57 for
discussion of margin regulation for options; Figlewski, supra note 20, at 405-09.
34 7 U.S.C. § 7a(12) (1982).
35 See FEDERAL RESERVE REPORT, supra note 6, at 4.
36 The FEDERAL RESERVE REPORT traces the history of futures margins in the United
States. The present system with margins set by the futures exchanges was in place by
the 1930s. Congress has specifically rejected federally set margins for futures contracts.
Id. at 56.
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margin account falls below the maintenance margin on any day, the
investor must replenish the margin account or his position is
closed. 37 In addition, each clearing member firm guarantees the
contract of its customers. 38
Minimum margin requirements are set by a margin committee
comprised of members of the futures exchange. Futures commis-
sion merchants, analogous to brokers in equity markets, are free to
set margins above the minimum-and they often do so. It is in their
interest to find the margin level associated with the lowest risk-ad-
justed cost of futures contracts. If the margin is set too low and an
investor defaults on the contract, a member of the margin commit-
tee must cover the default.39
Each futures exchange issues four margin requirements denom-
inated in dollar amounts: initial and maintenance margins for mar-
ket makers and institutions with hedged positions, and initial and
maintenance margins for speculators, defined as investors with fu-
tures positions not offset by stock positions. Presently, an un-
hedged investor can be long or short about $140,000 of S&P 500
futures for an initial payment of $20,000. If the investor is long one
S&P 500 futures contract and the price remains unchanged, the po-
sition can be reversed at any time, and the $20,000 is returned. The
reversal would occur automatically at the expiration of the contract
if no action were taken. If the price falls, then the $20,000 is dimin-
ished by the amount of decrease in the entire contract. If the initial
margin falls below the maintenance margin level ($4,000), the inves-
tor must pay to bring the margin back above the initial level. This
adjustment, or "mark to the market," occurs daily. If funds are not
received by 7:00 A.M. on the morning following the margin call, the
position is closed.40 From the standpoint of the exchange, the risk
to be avoided is a one day price movement in either direction that is
larger than the level of the maintenance margin. Thus, margins are
set in an attempt to predict price volatility and support the credibil-
ity of the market.
37 Individual brokerage firms frequently require higher margins from their custom-
ers. Id. at 61.
38 For a more complete discussion of margin requirements for future contracts, see
id. at 57-64.
39 See Figlewski, supra note 20, at 391-99 for a discussion of the incentives of ex-
change members in setting margins.
40 On October 19, 1987, there were two intra-day margin calls, with a one hour
grace period, as well as the normal mark to market at close, with a grace period until
7:00 A.M. the following morning.
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TABLE 1
S&P 500 STOCK INDEX FUTURES MARGIN REQUIREMENTS
(CHICAGO MERCANTILE EXCHANGE)
Date Margin Levels
Speculator Hedger/Market Maker
From To Initial Maintenance Initial Maintenance
04/21/82 10/25/82 $ 6,000 $ 2,500 $ 2,500 $ 1,500
10/25/82 01/30/87 $ 6,000 $ 2,500 $ 3,000 $ 2,500
01/30/87 10/19/87 $10,000 $ 5,000 $ 5,000 $ 5,000
10/19/87 10/22/87 $10,000 $ 7,500 $ 7,500 $ 7,500
10/22/87 10/28/87 $15,000 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000
10/28/87 10/29/87 $20,000 $12,500 $12,500 $12,500
10/29/87 12/18/87 $20,000 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000
12/18/87 03/08/88 $15,000 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000
03/08/88 09/22/88 $18,000 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000
09/22/88 - $20,000 $ 4,000 $ 4,000 $ 4,000
Source: Chicago Mercantile Exchange
Table 1 shows the margin requirements issued by the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange from the first sale of S&P 500 futures contracts
on April 21, 1982 through September 1988. Changes have been
infrequent, with none between October 1982 and January 1987.
Part of the cost of entering into a futures contract depends on the
initial margin as a percent of the value of the contract. Figure 1
illustrates the initial margin paid by speculators, as a percent of the
value of the S&P 500 futures contract from April 1982 through No-
vember 1988.41 The long decrease in the margin level as a percent
of contract value from 1982 to January 1987 is due to the increase in
the level of the S&P 500 futures contract. The initial margin for
speculators shown in Figure 1 has received the most attention and is
the most relevant for testing the effect of margins on price volatility.
But the maintenance margin is more relevant with respect to the risk
borne by the exchange members, because it is the level that must be
maintained to guard against adverse price movement.
II
APPROPRIATE MARGIN LEVELS FOR STOCK INDEX FUTURES
A. Financial Integrity of Futures Markets
The primary role of margins in futures markets is to ensure that
investors perform on the contracts to which they are committed,
thus protecting futures commission merchants from their custom-
41 The closing price on the futures contract for the S&P 500 at the CME was used
except for occasional days within the time series when the closing price was unavailable.
In those cases the settle price was used. The settle price was also used after March 1,
1988.
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ers' losses and maintaining investor confidence in futures markets.
For contract performance, optimal margin levels should be deter-
mined by: (1) the volatility of the futures price, (2) the length of the
"grace period" that the customer has to meet a margin call, and (3)
the correlation among price movements of all positions held by the
trader.42 Margin levels of 100 percent would completely protect fu-
tures commission merchants from default risk, but high margin
levels also could mean less participation in futures markets with a
corresponding reduction in liquidity, a consideration discussed in
the following sections.
The price volatility of futures contracts is an important determi-
nant of appropriate margin levels because volatility determines the
probability that the price will move enough that the investor's initial
margin deposit will be insufficient and that he will face a margin call.
The length of the margin grace period, the time the trader has to
meet his margin call, is important because further price movements
against the trader could result in depletion of the margin account
before the grace period ends. Offsetting positions are relevant be-
cause other holdings can reduce the overall riskiness of the inves-
tor's position.
These considerations are consistent with the existing lower
margins for stock-index futures contracts compared to equity con-
tracts. The Interim Report of the Working Group on Financial Mar-
kets notes:
[T]he prudential maintenance margin percentages required for
carrying an individual stock should be significantly higher than the
percentage margin required for a futures contract on a stock in-
dex. This conclusion follows from the facts that stock indexes
have a smaller percentage price variability than do individual
stocks and the payment period for margins in the futures market is
shorter than the period for stocks.43
The price volatility of a stock index such as the S&P 500 futures
contract is significantly lower than the volatility of any individual
stock, and the daily marking to market that occurs at the CME and
other exchanges that trade stock index futures shortens the grace
period for making margin calls compared to those for equity securi-
42 See F. EDWARDS & S. NEFTCI, EXTREME MOVEMENTS IN FUTURES PRICES: IMPLICA-
TIONS FOR SETrING MARGINS (CSFM Working Paper Series No. 138, 1986) and Figlewski,
supra note 20, at 385-416 for discussion of appropriate margin levels for protection of
integrity of futures markets.
43 See Interim Report of the Working Group on Financial Markets [hereinafter In-
terim Report]. (The Working Group consisted of George Gould, Under Secretary for
Finance, Department of the Treasury; Wendy Gramm, Chairman, CFTC; Alan Green-
span, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and David Ruder,
Chairman, SEC.)
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ties. In addition, futures exchanges explicitly consider the correla-
tion between traders' holdings in distinguishing between hedgers
and speculators: hedgers who, by definition, have holdings that are
negatively correlated with their futures position, often are granted
margin requirements lower than those of speculators.
TABLE 2
PRICE VOLATILITY AND MARGIN LEVELS
(INITIAL MARGINS FOR SPECULATORS AT THE CME)
Margin
Time Period Price Volatilitya Coverage Ratiob
1982 0.026 4.97
1983 0.013 6.33
1984 0.014 5.96
1985 0.013 6.03
1986 0.020 2.81
1987 0.032 3.75
1/88-5/88 0.020 6.24
1/87-9/87 0.019 3.77
10/87 0.154 0.93
11/87-5/88 0.024 5.77
4/82-5/88 0.020 5.03
'Daily coefficient of variation over one month, averaged over each month.
b Ratio of the initial margin for speculators to the daily standard deviation of
contract value over one month, averaged over each month.
Table 2 reports margin coverage ratios, a measure of the level
of protection provided by margins, over several periods for the S&P
500 futures contract. The statistic essentially adjusts the stated mar-
gin level by the price volatility of the contract. The margin coverage
ratio, equal to the initial margin level for speculators divided by the
daily standard deviation of the price change of the contract averaged
over each month, is analogous to a t-statistic. For example, a mar-
gin coverage ratio of 2 means that, assuming futures prices approxi-
mate a normal distribution, there is a 2.5 percent chance that a one-
day price change will exceed the initial margin level for speculators.
A margin coverage ratio of 3.5 implies a daily default probability of
0.02 percent. 44
44 See D. BREEDEN, FUTURES MARGINS AS PREDICTORS OF PRICE VOLATILITY (CSFM
Working Paper No. 115, 1985) for discussion of margin coverage ratios. Breeden notes
that futures returns have been found to have "fatter-tailed" distributions than normal,
and thus the margin coverage ratio may underestimate the true probabilities of extreme
moves. Id. at 12.
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Since the crash, the margin coverage ratio indicates a higher
level of protection than for any year since 1985, despite higher vola-
tility immediately following the crash. The average margin coverage
ratio at the CME for the S&P 500 futures index from April 1982
(when the contract began trading) through May 1988 is 5.03. Since
October 1987, the average margin coverage ratio is 5.77. During
October 1987, the margin coverage ratio was only 0.943, reflecting
the price volatility of that period.
Three considerations should be kept in mind when discussing
the margin coverage ratio: (1) the default probabilities overestimate
risk because they only include funds in the margin account, not
other funds available to investors for margin calls; (2) the exchanges
can make intra-day margin calls and raise margins in response to
changes in price volatility; and (3) the default danger of any given
margin level must be weighed against the costs of higher margins
during normal trading.
The futures exchanges generally use past market conditions
and price volatility to estimate appropriate margin levels. Breeden
examines margin levels for eleven commodities at the Chicago
Board of Trade (CBT) from 1977 to 1982 and finds that exchange
policy outperforms more sophisticated models. 45 Empirically, mar-
gin policy has been satisfactory with respect to the financial integrity
and efficiency of the futures markets, a consensus with which most
observers agree.46 Even throughout the market crash period of Oc-
tober 1987, not one investor lost money due to default at either the
CME or the CBT:
[T]he futures clearing organizations collected all variation margin
called for without default, despite daily price swings of unprece-
dented size. For example, the price of a single S&P 500 futures
contract declined by $40,378 on October 19 and price moves of
approximately $7000 per contract occurred on both October 20
and October 22.... As market volatility indicated the potential
for one-day price movements of unprecedented magnitude, the
clearing organizations adjusted customer margin requirements to
provide increased security.4 7
B. Appropriate Futures Margins From the Viewpoint of the
Equity Markets
Since the introduction of the S&P 500 futures contract in 1982,
its popularity and that of similar index derivative products has in-
45 See id. at 6-11.
46 See, e.g., INTERIM REPORT, supra note 43, at 5; FOLLOIV-UP REPORT, supra note 2, at
65.
47 See FOLLOW-UP REPORT, supra note 2, at 65.
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creased tremendously. A large portion of traders in these contracts,
especially institutions, use the instruments in connection with stock
market transactions. Index futures and options allow easy invest-
ment in overall market behavior as compared to purchasing a simi-
lar portfolio of stocks. Index futures and options can be used to
hedge against market declines. In addition, the simultaneous trad-
ing of two related products leads to the development of active index
arbitrage.48
The Katzenbach Report identifies four reasons why traders pre-
fer to make their transactions in the futures markets.49 First, bro-
kerage fees are substantially lower in futures markets, ranging
between 5 and 10 percent of the costs in equity markets for similar
transactions. Second, index futures and options transactions are
quicker and easier to implement as opposed to trading a basket of
stocks. Third, index trades generally have less price impact due to
the market structure of futures and options markets. Fourth, lower
margin levels for futures contracts allow increased leverage.
Most of the official policy statements following the market de-
cline in October 1987 advocated increases in margins on stock in-
dex futures contracts. 50  While the studies recognized the
importance of stock index futures for hedging and securities market
investment, several studies expressed concern over excessive lever-
age used for investing in these products. The Brady Commission,
the SEC's Division of Market Regulation and the New York Stock
Exchange's Katzenbach Report all argued that margins on stock in-
dex futures contracts should be increased. Implicit in this recom-
mendation is that excessive speculation in futures markets can result
in feedback effects in the stock market, driving equity prices away
from their true value. No report, however, defines the concept of
excessive speculation.
The argument for government intervention to raise the level of
margins on stock index futures presumes that these margin levels
have an external effect on the futures markets. The external effect
occurs because index arbitrage links cash prices and futures prices.
If low futures markets margins cause high price volatility in both
markets, then placing authority to set margins for both markets in
48 See N. KATZENBACH, AN OVERVIEW OF PROGRAM TRADING AND ITS IMPACT ON CUR-
RENT MARKET PRACTICES 10 (1987) (commissioned by the New York Stock Exchange) for
discussion of trading strategies such as portfolio insurance and index arbitrage.
49 See id. at 8.
50 Not all official responses have been for higher margins in futures contracts. The
INTERIM REPORT, supra note 43, at 5, states that they are against raising futures margins
on stock index contracts beyond "prudential" margins, though Chairman Ruder dis-
sented from this point. The FOLLOW-UP REPORT, supra note 2, at 3, rejects higher per-
formance margins in futures markets.
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one regulatory body accounts for the impact of margins in both
markets and provides a framework for raising futures margins.
Before such a change is made, the theory and evidence supporting it
must be examined closely. The following sections begin that exami-
nation by first considering the impact of futures markets on cash
markets. Then we consider the impact of changing futures margins
on futures markets.
III
THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THE FUTURES AND
CASH MARKET
A. Prices are Linked by Index Arbitrage
Equity and futures markets respond to the same underlying
economic factors; index arbitrage links the two markets. When the
S&P 500 futures price moves away from its "fair value" with respect
to the S&P 500 cash index, arbitragers transact in both markets,
keeping the markets in equilibrium. The index arbitrager acts as a
messenger carrying price movement that occurs in one market to
the other market. If informationless speculation dominates futures
markets, the link can result in incorrect messages being sent to the
equity market by index arbitragers.
The price of a futures contract equals the price of the underly-
ing index at the expiration of the futures contract. In equilibrium,
the cash (equity) price equals the futures price except for differences
in carrying costs until the expiration of the contract. 51 The carrying
cost of the cash index equals the risk-adjusted rate of return on the
best alternative use of the invested capital, minus the dividend rate
of the stocks. The carrying cost of the futures index is close to zero.
In equilibrium, the cash price is lower than the futures price because
it is more expensive to hold the cash index than the futures index.
The difference between the futures price and the actual cash price in
equilibrium is referred to as the basis.
Index arbitrage occurs when the futures price rises above (falls
below) its fair value relation to stock prices. This "basis error"
prompts the purchase (sale) of the stocks in an index and the sale
(purchase) of the futures contract based on the index. Index arbi-
trage returns stock and futures prices to their fair value relation.
52
51 The relationship has been documented by many researchers. See, e.g., Figlewski,
supra note 20, at 385; Kawaller, Koch & Koch, The Temporal Price Relationship between S&P
500 Futures and the S&P 500 Index, 42 J. FIN. 1309 (1987).
52 Most index arbitrage positions are opened by one of the major broker-dealers,
either for their own account or for the account of a customer. Often the beneficiary
already owns a large stock portfolio so an arbitrage sell program (selling stock and buy-
ing futures) can take place without regard to the uptick rule. A typical transaction may
8871989]
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Because stock prices must equal futures prices at the expiration of
the futures contract, an open arbitrage position can be reversed at
expiration with a certain relation between the prices. This certainty
gives the characteristics of buying a Treasury Bill to an arbitrage
position holding the underlying stocks and the futures contract.
For example, suppose an investor opens a long arbitrage posi-
tion, buying the underlying stocks and selling one futures contract.
Assume that the cash price of the underlying equity securities is 250
index points and the futures contract price is 262.50 index points,
the dividend rate is 5 percent, and the interest rate is 10 percent.
When the position is opened the arbitrager purchases the stock for
$250.00 (paying the full $250 rather than purchasing on margin)
and sells the futures contract for $262.50. If the futures margin was
zero, the futures transactions would be costless.53 At the expiration,
the stock and the futures contract have the same price by definition.
Thus, at settlement, the investor would gain the initial difference
between the cash and futures price-$12.50. 54 Between the open
and the expiration, assumed for simplicity to be one year, the arbi-
trager receives another $12.50 from the dividends on the stock (5
percent times $250) for a total gain of $25.00, a 10 percent return
on the initial investment of $250 used to open the position. This
equals the gain that would have been possible investing in Treasury
bills at 10 percent. A short arbitrage position can be constructed
that also guarantees a certain return.
Any time futures contracts rise above (fall below) their fair
value relation to stock prices, an interest rate above the risk-free rate
can be secured by opening a long (short) arbitrage position.55 Such
an arbitrage position will tend to move the markets back to equilib-
rium. A long (short) position entails buying (selling) stock and sell-
ing (buying) futures so stock prices rise (fall) and futures prices fall
(rise), moving them toward fair value.56
In the absence of transaction costs, a minuscule basis error
involve a value-weighted basket ofjust under 500 of the S&P 500 stocks with a value of
about $10 million, and about 60 futures contracts. In the popular press, the term index
arbitrage, which accounts for the majority of trading in lists of stocks, is often used inter-
changeably with program trading.
53 If the futures margin is posted in Treasury bills, as commonly occurs, the oppor-
tunity cost of margins approaches zero.
54 Note that the price of the futures contract will not necessarily be $250.00 nor will
the equity necessarily be worth $262.50. It is certain, however, that the futures contract
will be worth the same amount as the equity, implying a $12.50 gain.
55 If the prices move toward equality faster than does their fair value relation the
same profit can be secured in a shorter time period, securing a higher adjusted interest
rate.
56 For evidence of these relationships and the price effect of arbitrage transactions,
see Furbush, Program Trading and Price Movement: Evidence From the October 1987 Market
Crash, 18 FIN. MGMT 68 (1989).
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would trigger index arbitrage. In practice, transaction costs create a
range around the fair value of the futures price within which index
arbitrage is not triggered. If transaction costs are high, small price
changes will not trigger index arbitrage. Significant price changes,
however, will trigger large amounts of index arbitrage and price
changes will be more abrupt than if transaction costs were low.
Lower transaction costs suggest better linkage between the markets
and more frequent, though smoother, price movements.57 Transac-
tion costs are present due to margin requirements, the bid-ask
spread, the uptick rule, uncertainty due to variation in interest rates
and dividend rates, and uncertainty resulting from the arbitrager's
ability to transact in both markets simultaneously.58
B. tvidence on the Price Link
The theoretical arbitrage relation discussed above links futures
prices to cash prices. Many researchers have examined the strength
of that link. Stoll and Whaley identify characteristics of cash and
futures prices that would occur if the S&P 500 cash and futures
prices were perfect substitutes.59 We discuss a modified version of
these characteristics: (1) the futures price would always be at its
equilibrium value relative to the cash price; (2) the volatility of cash
and futures prices would be identical; (3) the contemporaneous cor-
relation between futures and cash prices would be high and each
noncontemporaneous correlation would be zero; and (4) the level of
serial correlation between the cash and futures market would be
identical. Evidence concerning these characteristics is briefly re-
viewed below.
1. Futures and Cash Prices in Equilibrium Relation
For the first few months after the genesis of the S&P 500 fu-
tures contract in April 1982, futures prices were significantly below
their expected equilibrium value. Cornell and French explored this
anomaly and attributed the futures discount to a tax timing benefit
that only accrued to holders of stock. 60 The futures prices discount
disappeared, however, late in 1982. Subsequent research by Figlew-
57 For discussions of this point see M. MILLER, FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS AND MARKET
VOLATILITY 9 (University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business Working Paper,
1987); Grossman, An Analysis of the Implications for Stock and Futures Price Volatility of Program
Trading and Dynamic Hedging Strategies, 61J. Bus. 275, 291 (1988).
58 Kawaller, A Note: Debunking the Myth of the Risk-Free Return, 7 J. FUTURES MARKETS
327 (1987) discusses the role of transaction costs.
59 See H. STOLL & R. WHALEY, THE DYNAMICS OF STOCK INDEX AND STOCK INDEX
FUTURES PRICES (Fuqua School of Business, Duke University Working Paper, 1988).
60 See Cornell & French, Taxes and the Pricing of Stock Index Futures, 38 J. FIN. 675
(1983).
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ski, with the benefit of hindsight and additional data, attributed the
initial discount to institutional inertia and unfamiliarity with the new
security.6' Later work by Stoll and Whaley and by MacKinlay and
Ramaswamy found that the futures price approximates the equilib-
rium price, as traditionally modeled. 62 Specifically, MacKinlay and
Ramaswamy found that basis error increases with the time until ex-
piration and that its path is serially correlated due to the trading
activity of arbitragers.
2. Volatility of Cash and Futures Prices
MacKinlay and Ramaswamy examined cash and futures prices
from April 1982 through June 1987 and found that futures price
volatility generally exceeds that of the S&P 500 cash index.63 Much
of the higher measured futures volatility is due to nonsynchronous
trading among some of the S&P 500 stocks, but even after account-
ing for nonsynchronous trading, some difference remains. This vol-
atility may be due to the different trading systems employed in the
cash and futures markets.
3. Contemporaneous Correlation of Cash and Futures Prices
Contemporaneous rates of return in the cash and futures mar-
kets are highly correlated. Stoll and Whaley find the contemporane-
ous correlation to have been stable at about 0.55 throughout the
1980s, and Kawaller, Koch, and Koch find a significant contempora-
neous relationship for the vast majority of the days tested in 1984
and 1985.64 Both studies also test for noncontemporaneous corre-
lation between the prices, finding that futures prices lead cash prices
by five to forty-five minutes, but that cash prices do not lead futures
prices. The futures market is frequently called the "price discovery"
market for this reason.
4. Serial Correlation in Cash and Futures Prices
A basic characteristic of an efficient market is that you cannot
learn about the expected return in the next period from any previ-
ous returns. Zero serial correlation in both markets would be asso-
ciated with both markets being efficient. They might be linked but
not efficient, in which case both price series would exhibit identical
61 See Figlewski, Hedging Performance and Basis Risk in Stock Index Futures, 39 J. FIN.
657, 669 (1984); Figlewski, Explaining the Early Discounts on Stock Index Futures: The Case for
Disequilibrium, 40 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 43, 46 (1984).
62 See H. STOLL & R. WHALEY, supra note 59; C. MACKINLAY & K. RAMASWAMY, IN-
DEx-FUTURES ARBITRAGE AND THE BEHAVIOR OF STOCK INDEX FUTURES PRICES (The
Wharton School Working Paper, 1988).
63 C. MACKINLAY & K. RAMASWAMY, supra note 62.
64 See Kawaller, Koch & Koch, supra note 51; H. STOLL & R. WHALEY, supra note 59.
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nonzero autocorrelation. MacKinlay and Ramaswamy, and Stoll and
Whaley find slight negative first order autocorrelation in the futures
index that can be attributed to prices bouncing between the bid and
ask price. Stoll and Whaley find positive autocorrelation in the eq-
uity index for lags of up to fifteen minutes from 1982 through Au-
gust 1984. Since then, however, positive autocorrelation persists
for only five minute lags. They suggest that the reduction is proba-
bly due to diminished nonsynchronous trading and higher volume.
These results are verified in MacKinlay and Ramaswamy. Kleidon
examines autocorrelation prior to, and following the October 1987
market crash. 65 He finds no autocorrelation in either price series
before the crash but significant autocorrelation in the cash market
following the crash.
In sum, the S&P 500 futures prices are clearly linked with the
cash index prices. There are, however, minor weaknesses in the
linkage: nonsynchronous trading leads the S&P 500 cash index to
be an inaccurate measurement of the underlying stocks; the cost of
carry model that is usually employed does not properly account for
the true equilibrium futures price; and there are actual inefficiencies
that continue to furnish opportunities for substantial arbitrage prof-
its. Because of the strength of the basic linkage, trading policy in
each market that affects prices in that market will have external ef-
fects in the other market: if lower futures margins increase futures
price volatility then some (but not all) of the increase in volatility
will spill into the cash market.
Harris provides a direct test of the impact of stock index futures
trading on prices of S&P 500 stocks.66 He finds that after 1983,
stock price returns for S&P 500 stocks have higher standard devia-
tions than those of similar stocks that are not components of deriva-
tive securities, though the increase is not large enough to be
economically significant. These results are consistent with the hy-
pothesis that trading in futures markets slightly increases volatility
in the underlying equity securities. Harris points out, however, that
many other factors changed in the recent period that could also con-
tribute to the increase in volatility.
IV
THE IMPACT OF FUTURES MARGINS ON FUTURES TRADING
A. Costs of Futures Margins
In determining investment strategy, investors consider all pos-
65 A. KLEIDON, ARBITRAGE, NON-TRADING, AND STALE PRICES: OCTOBER 1987
(Graduate School of Business, Stanford University Working Paper, 1988).
66 See Harris, S&P 500 Cash Stock Price Volatilities, J. FIN (forthcoming Dec. 1989).
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sible investments, limited by their net worth and borrowing capabili-
ties, and choose optimal portfolios that balance expected risks and
returns of each asset. The optimal level of futures contracts in any
given portfolio is a direct function of the associated costs. If margin
authorities raise the cost of holding futures contracts, then it is ex-
pected that investors would decrease their futures positions.
Most commentators argue that increasing margin levels in-
creases the cost of transactions in futures markets by raising the cap-
ital necessary to take a futures position.6 7 For the most part, retail
customers post their margin deposits in cash. Larger customers
may be able to post the margin in interest-bearing Treasury bills
already in their portfolios. However, even in these cases, higher
margins increase the costs of futures trading because the Treasury
bills no longer can be used to satisfy liquidity needs. 68
Commentators often ignore the fact that increasing margin re-
quirements in futures markets may also affect costs of trading fu-
tures contracts in an indirect manner. Indirect costs include
execution costs of futures market transactions. If higher margins
result in fewer futures transactions, the liquidity of the futures mar-
ket is probably reduced. 69 The increased trading, both speculative
and hedging, resulting from low futures margins allows prices to
adjust rapidly to new information, producing more efficient pricing.
Large volume also ensures that every buyer or seller will generally
find it easier to match with the other side of the contract, resulting
in lower bid-ask spreads.
Another possible drawback of using the level of margins in
stock-index futures markets as a policy instrument to rescue exces-
sive speculation is that it may not have the expected impact. For
example, Hartzmark argues that margin policy is unpredictable even
under the following extreme assumptions: government regulators
67 Telser, Figlewski, and Tomek maintain that changing margin levels alter transac-
tion costs in futures markets. Telser, Margins and Futures Contracts, I J. FUrURES MARKETS
225 (1981); Telser & Yamey, Speculation and Margins, 73 J. POL. EcoN. 656 (1965);
Figlewski, Margins and Market Integrity: Margin Settingfor Stock Index Futures and Options, 4J.
FUTURES MARKETS 385 (1984); Tomek, Margins on Futures Contracts: Their Economic Roles
and Regulation in FUTURES MARKETS: REGULATORY ISSUES 143 (A. Peck ed. 1985). Cf
Black, The Pricing of Commodity Contracts, 3J. FIN. ECON. 167, 169 (1976) and Dusak, Fu-
tures Trading and Investor Returns: An Investigation of Commodity Market Risk Premiums, 81 J.
POL. ECON. 1387, 1391 (1973) disagree with this position. Black argues that the cost of
the margin is zero because the contract is marked to market every day. Thus, the con-
tract is essentially rewritten daily. However, Black's position does not consider the op-
portunity cost of the initial margin. Dusak argues that the liability of any futures
contract is the full value of the contract not simply the margin. Thus, investment deci-
sions would depend on the full liability, not just the margin level.
68 See Telser, supra note 67, at 235.
69 See Figlewski, supra note 20, at 393; Kahl, Rutz, & Sinquefield, The Economics of
Performance Margins in Futures Markets, 5 J. FUTURES MARKETS 103 (1985).
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can identify whether traders are speculators or hedgers; prices are
rising and will continue to do so (a price bubble); and naive specula-
tors are responsible for this price bubble. 70 Government regulators
may raise margins for speculators in an attempt to drive speculators
from the market, allowing futures prices to return to the correct val-
ues. However, if risk is an inferior good-the speculator's income
elasticity with respect to risk is negative-the cost effect of increased
margins may actually increase speculator demand for futures
contracts.
Figlewski argues further that increasing transaction costs tends
to eliminate investors with the lowest profit expectation. 7' Those
traders who expect to make only a very small profit on any trade will
leave the market, leaving only those traders with expectations of
much larger returns. Thus, the price in the futures market will be
determined by those who have relatively extreme opinions. He ar-
gues that this is unlikely to improve the stability or efficiency of fu-
tures markets.
Hartzmark develops a formal model that illustrates the uncer-
tain impact of changing margin levels on futures trading. The
model illustrates two important points. First, the model verifies
Figlewski's suggestion that those traders with price expectations
closest to the currently quoted market price will be the first to exit
the market when margin requirements are increased. This leaves
only those traders with price expectations that diverge most from
the market price as participants in the futures market. A market
composed of only those traders with extreme price expectations
would probably be less stable. Second, those traders who already
have the highest margin costs will react the most to a margin in-
crease. An individual trader's margin cost is a function of his ex-
pected borrowing rate and the uncertain liquidity cost if he is
required to liquidate his futures position. Hartzmark suggests, how-
ever, that it is impossible to predict whether speculators or hedgers
have higher margin costs.
A policy goal of higher margin levels is to reduce the volatility
of the market price of any futures contract. Even if regulatory au-
thorities were able to establish margin levels that initially encourage
the highest variance traders to leave the market, can it be certain
that the result will be less variance in pricing of futures contracts?
Hartzmark argues that it is impossible to predict the overall impact
on volatility since low variance traders may be earning their profits
from high variance traders. As profit opportunities disappear, low
70 See Hartzmark, The Effects of Changing Margin Levels on Futures Market Activity, the
Composition of Traders in the Market and Price Performance, 59 J. Bus. 146, 167-79 (1986).
71 See Figlewski, supra note 20, at 393.
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variance traders also may leave the market and the change in the
number of traders in each group and in the full market may result in
even more price variance. Therefore, Hartzmark's model predicts
that the impact of margin levels on volatility is uncertain.
In the real world, where margin authorities cannot accurately
identify investors whose trading has the largest impact on the vola-
tility of contract prices, margin policy is an imprecise tool to change
the activity of a particular player in the market. In the following
section, we empirically consider the impact of changing margin
levels for the S&P 500 stock-index futures on the volume of con-
tracts traded. We then consider the impact of changing margin
levels on the price volatility of the S&P 500 futures contract.
B. Evidence on the Effects of Margins on Futures Volume
Hartzmark's model has several hypotheses that can be tested
empirically. First, his model predicts that margin increases should
result in fewer open contracts. Hartzmark tests for this relation by
measuring the number of open contracts and the volume of futures
transactions before and after margin changes. Second, his model
predicts that higher cost traders should leave the market when mar-
gin levels increase. Hartzmark considers the mix of traders around
margin changes in an attempt to identify which traders are the
higher cost traders. Third, the model predicts that the impact of
margin changes on price volatility is indeterminate. Hartzmark tests
whether there is an empirical regularity between margins and price
volatility.
Using evidence from four futures markets (wheat, feeder cattle,
pork bellies, and U.S. Treasury bonds), Hartzmark finds that open
interest and trade volume do respond inversely to changes in mar-
gin levels. He finds, however, no systematic effect of margin
changes on the mix of traders (i.e., speculators versus hedgers) in
the markets. In similar work, Tomek's examination of 212 changes
in margin requirements of eight commodities over the period 1970
through 1982 finds no evidence of a consistent pattern between
margin levels and volume of trading. 72
72 See Tomek, supra note 67.
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TABLE 3
RATIO OF S&P 500 CONTRACTS TO THOUSANDS OF SHARES
TRADED ON THE NYSE, BEFORE AND AFTER
CHANGES IN MARGIN REQUIREMENTS
ON INDICATED DAYS.
Panel A: Average Volume of S&P 500 Contracts
Direction of
Date Before After t-statistica Margin Change
Outside of October 1987:
10/25/82 13192 13837 -1.78 +
1/30/87 91624 85630 1.08 +
12/18/87 64988 33069 4.06 -
3/08/88 50373 49618 0.12 +
9/22/88 51412 37227 2.78 -
During October 1987:
10/19/87 96764 50157 3.77 +
10/22/87 98559 40064 4.65 +
10/28/87 86213 41386 2.90 +
10/29/87 82179 42894 2.41 +
10/19-10/29/87 96764 41386 4.65 +
Panel B: Average volume of S&P 500 Contracts divided by volume on
NYSE (thousands of shares).
Outside of October 1987:
10/25/82 0.13 0.15 -1.62 +
1/30/87 0.48 0.46 0.21 +
12/18/87 0.32 0.19 2.95 -
3/08/88 0.26 0.30 -1.74 +
9/22/88 0.29 0.21 3.15 -
During October 1987:
10/19/87 0.46 0.18 4.60 +
10/22/87 0.41 0.18 3.69 +
10/28/87 0.32 0.22 1.04 +
10/29/87 0.30 0.23 0.33 +
10/19-10/29/87 0.46 0.22 4.40 +
The t-statistics are from Wilcoxon rank sum tests.
We use Hartzmark's methodology to determine the impact of
margin changes on the volume of traded contracts of the S&P 500
futures contract. Since April 1982, the CME has changed the re-
quired margin level nine times, with four changes occurring be-
tween October 19 and October 29, 1987. All but two of these
changes have increased the necessary margin level. We compare
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the mean volume of contracts in all S&P 500 contracts for fifteen
days prior to the change in the margin to the mean volume fifteen
days following the change. Because futures trading is highly corre-
lated with the volume of shares traded on the NYSE, we also com-
pare S&P 500 futures volume divided by volume of shares (in
thousands) traded on the NYSE. This standardization corrects for
changes in volume for seasonal or other reasons not specific to the
futures markets. The standardization is especially appropriate dur-
ing October 1987, when volume was unusually high.
Table 3 shows the average volume (Panel A) and average stan-
dardized volume (Panel B) before and after the nine margin changes
as well as for one additional event period that brackets the "crash"
period, from October 19 through October 29. In the non-crash pe-
riod, three of the five average volume measures and four of the five
standardized average volume measures changed in the direction
contradictory to prediction when required margin levels were al-
tered. In fact, the only changes in average volume (and average
standardized volume) that are significantly different from zero at the
95 percent confidence level are decreases in volume when margin
levels are decreased (on December 18, 1987 and September 22,
1988). 73
During the crash period in October, margin levels for the S&P
500 index futures contract were increased on four days. In every
case, the average volume (and average standardized volume) of S&P
500 contracts declined following the margin increase, and also de-
clined in the fifteen days following our "crash" window (October 19
through October 29) as opposed to the fifteen days before it. How-
ever, throughout this period, futures contracts were trading at dis-
counts from their "fair value" and the NYSE DOT system (which
enhances inter-market trading) was closed by the NYSE until No-
vember 9. These factors diminish the substitutability of futures for
equities and lower the volume of the derivative product. Given the
importance of these factors, it is very difficult to interpret the results
from this period.
C. Futures Margins and Price Volatility
Two variants exist to the view that speculators increase price
volatility: speculators, at all times, exacerbate price swings; and dur-
ing normal periods speculators enhance liquidity, but only tempo-
rarily and in a way that cannot be depended on during emergencies.
73 Significance tests are performed using Wilcoxon rank sum tests. These tests are
used when the underlying distribution of the random variable is unknown.
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This section discusses the nature of price volatility and market li-
quidity, and the effect of speculators on these variables.
Price volatility, usually measured as the standard deviation of
prices, provides a proxy for risk. Other things equal, stable prices
are beneficial and investors will pay to eliminate the risk of a loss.
The payment is observed as a positive association between risk and
rate of return.74 But prices do change, and their adjustment to re-
flect "underlying values" is one of the hallmarks of an efficient mar-
ket. The tradeoff between price stability and price efficiency is at the
core of the financial market policy debate. Regulators may prefer
stability but also must recognize that prices change to reflect
changes in underlying values. 75 A price that is moving slowly to-
ward a new equilibrium is no more at its underlying value than one
that overshoots and returns to the new equilibrium.
Black argues that two forces act on observed prices: news and
noise. 76 When trading that is based on dramatic, new information
(news) results in substantial price changes, those price changes will
indicate substantial volatility, though the market may be able to han-
dle large volumes of trade at the revised price. The news has caused
homogeneity of investor perceptions. 77 When traders with similar
perceptions dominate the market, prices will be more volatile since
all traders change their valuations simultaneously.
With the addition of noise traders, volatility can be decreased
because differing valuations provide depth to the market, while the
noise they generate increases the incentive for the entry of news
traders. Black and Bernstein both argue that noise traders are nec-
essary for liquid markets, though the existence of noise decreases
the efficiency of the pricing mechanism. 78 Noise traders tend to
drive prices away from fundamental values inducing the entry of in-
formation traders who bring prices back. Thus, a tradeoff exists be-
tween liquidity and efficiency, and more liquid markets result from
increased numbers of noise traders in the market.
This analysis raises doubts as to the advisability of raising trans-
actions costs for noise traders (speculators) because their trading
can increase the liquidity of markets. The argument can be ex-
tended to all traders. The thinner market implied by fewer traders
and trades leads to higher volatility and lower measured liquidity
74 For a thorough study of risk and return, see R. IBBOTSON & R. SINQUEFIELD,
STOCKS, BONDS, BILLS AND INFLATION: THE PAST AND THE FUTURE (1982).
75 For a discussion of this, see F. EDWARDS, DOES FUTURES TRADING INCREASE
STOCK MARKET VOLATILITY? 3 (Columbia University Working Paper, 1987).
76 See Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529 (1986).
77 See Telser, supra note 67, at 237.
78 See Bernstein, Liquidity, Stock Markets, and Market Makers, 16 FIN. MGMT. 54, 55
(1987) and Black, supra note 76, at 529.
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regardless of the type of trader. 79 As noted above, Hartzmark ar-
gues that even if regulators are able to force the highest variance
traders from the market, it is not certain what effect that would have
on overall volatility. As some noise traders leave the market, news
traders who profited from them may also leave.80 In fact, Hartzmark
found no evidence of a relationship between margin levels and
volatility.8 1
TABLE 4
SPECULATOR POSITIONS DURING THE MARKET BREAK
(S&P 500 FUTURES AT THE CME)
Percent Change
Net Speculator in S&P 500
Positionsa Net Position as Futures Closing
Date (contracts) Percent of Volume Price
10/16/87 + 2,826 2.1% - 5.4%
10/19/87 + 8,807 5.4% -28.6%
10/20/87 - 6,252 4.9% + 7.3%
10/21/87 -11,646 12.7% +19.4%
10/22/87 - 2,832 4.9% - 5.3%
'Based on Chicago Mercantile Exchange, "Preliminary Report of the Committee of
Inquiry to Examine the Events Surrounding October 19, 1987," Photocopied, at
Table 5.
Some express the concern that though speculators provide in-
creased liquidity on ordinary trading days, they may leave the mar-
ket during volatile periods. However, as reported in Table 4, on
October 16, and October 19, when futures prices fell, speculators
were net buyers, and on October 20 and 21, when futures prices
rose, speculators were net sellers. Only on October 22 was the net
speculator position in the same direction as the movement of the
market. Therefore, during the October stock market crash, the role
of futures market speculators was to dampen price swings and add
liquidity to the market. On October 19, the net position of specula-
tors accounted for 8,807 S&P 500 contracts, or 5.4 percent of total
S&P 500 futures index volume.
We test the effect of changes in margin levels on S&P 500 fu-
tures price volatility using methodology similar to that used by
Hartzmark.8 2 Price volatility measures were obtained for 15 days on
either side of the change in margin level. Margin changes are effec-
79 See Telser, supra note 23, at 241.
80 See Tomek, supra note 67, at 183.
81 See Hartzmark, supra note 70, at S 175.
82 Id.
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tive at the close on the date given so the "before" test period in-
cludes the event date and the 14 days prior and the "after" test
period includes the 15 days following the event date. The mean of
each volatility measure before the margin change was compared to
the mean following the margin change. The event dates used were
for changes in the initial margin level applicable to speculators, be-
cause the conjectured link between margin levels and price volatility
depends on the role of speculators. Since the inception of the S&P
500 futures contract there have been five changes to this margin
level. Unfortunately for our testing purposes, only two of the
changes occurred outside of October 1987. We also compare the
pre-crash period with the post-crash period.
Our measure of inter-day volatility is the square of the daily
percent change in closing price (PCS), computed in the following
manner:
PCS = [log(P,) - (log(P._.)] 2
Our measure of intra-day volatility, derived by Garman and
Klass, s3 uses the open, high, low, and closing prices (OHLC). Be-
cause it uses more daily information than the close-to-close esti-
mate, it is a more efficient volatility estimator. It is computed in the
following manner:
OHLC = .0511 (u-d)2 -0.019[c(u+d)-2ud]-0.383c 2,
where:
u = log (High Price) - log (Open Price),
d = log (Low Price) - log (Open Price), and
c = log (Close Price) - log (Open Price).
83 See Garman & Klass, On the Estimation of Security Price Volatilities from Historical Data,
53J. Bus. 67 (1980).
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TABLE 5
MEAN OF PRICE VOLATILITY MEASURES BEFORE AND AFTER CHANGES
IN MARGIN LEVELS (X 104)
(STANDARD DEVIATIONS IN PARENTHESES)
Price Change Squareda OHLC Volatility Indexb
Margin
Date Before After t-statc Before After t-statc Change
1/30/87 1.65 0.99 0.58 2.04 1.14 0.66 +
(2.31) (1.15) (3.63) (0.75)
10/22/87 106.31 13.56 0.12 55.42 9.82 -1.12 +
(285.68) (20.81) (113.44) (9.55)
10/28/87 112.10 7.55 1.49 61.60 4.05 1.91 +
(284.24) (10.51) (110.92) (3.70)
12/18/87 3.85 8.25 0.08 2.58 2.55 1.99 -
(5.00) (19.02) (1.15) (4.15)
3/08/88 0.73 1.49 0.08 1.01 0.76 0.58 +
(0.95) (2.34) (0.95) (0.44)
10/22/87 106.31 7.55 0.62 55.42 4.05 -0.37 +
10/29/87 (285.68) (10.51) (113.44) (3.70)
'Inter-day volatility = [log(P,) -log(P,_,)] 2 .
b Intra-day volatility=0.51 l(u - d)2 - 0.019[c(u+d)-2ud] - 0.383c0 where u = log
(high P)-log (open P), d = log (low P)-log(open P) and c = log (close P)-log (open
P).
' The t-statistics are from Wilcoxon rank sum test.
As shown in Table 5, the tests used here do not support the
hypothesis that volatility is affected by changes in margin levels.
There was only one statistically significant difference in the means of
either volatility estimator in any of the six events tested. For each of
the six events, however, at least one of the volatility estimators
changed in the hypothesized direction, and in four of the cases both
did so. Because of the small sample size and the fact that the under-
lying distribution of the OHLC estimator is unknown, the Wilcoxon
rank sum test, which is used to determine the significance of the
difference in means, is necessarily weak. The fact that all of the mar-
gin changes except those on December 18, 1987 and March 8, 1988
were in response to large price movements compounds this
weakness.
CONCLUSION
Many commentators have recommended policy changes with
respect to our financial markets to prevent a reccurrence of the Oc-
tober 1987 crash. One suggestion has been to increase margin
levels for stock index futures products. It is argued that low mar-
gins for purchasing stock index future contracts encourage specula-
tion in these products, with negative repercussions on equity
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markets. In this paper we considered the economic rationale and
evidence for this argument.
The evidence presented here does not support a policy decision
of higher margins in futures markets. Though margins do impose
costs on traders, the effect of margin changes on volume is difficult
to measure and there is no evidence of a systematic relation between
different margin levels and the proportion of trading by speculators.
Even if low margins encourage speculative trading, there is no em-
pirical support for the view that speculators raise price volatility,
and theoretical reasoning supports the view that speculators provide
liquidity to markets. Recent evidence, although limited, suggests
that higher margins for stock index futures are not associated with
lower price volatility in futures markets.
Even if there were evidence of excessive speculation in futures
markets due to low margins, a final consideration must be who
should set margin levels to control this speculation. Though this
point is not the focus of this paper, it is an important policy consid-
eration. Perhaps futures and equity exchanges should be allowed to
determine the appropriate margin levels without government inter-
vention, contracting with each other to internalize any cross-market
effects. Professor Merton Miller argues:
The issue of futures margins and the question of who sets them
are more than just organizational details. There are delicate busi-
ness trade-offs involved. In my view, taking these business deci-
sions away from the private sector, where incentives are right, and
transferring them to the public sector, where the incentives are
wrong, will ultimately kill the futures industry.8 4
84 See Merton Miller, quoted in After the Crash: Linkages Between Stocks and Futures, 12
REG. 29, 58 (1988).
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